By Noah Khogali, Vice Chair for Policy, Conservative Commonwealth Group
In an era increasingly defined by uncertainty, the spring of 2025 may mark a historic turning point in global trade. President Trump’s return to the White House has ushered in sweeping tariffs, denting world trade and market confidence: a 10% blanket duty on most US imports, with higher rates for 57 nations, including Commonwealth partners like Nigeria (14%), South Africa (30%) and Lesotho (50%), many of which were then put on temporary pause. The economic rationale is vague, but the geopolitical consequences are deeply profound.
These tariffs are not merely protectionist rhetoric made real. They are the opening act in what many Republicans envision as a full reset of the global trading system. As America turns inward and the rules-based order continues to fray, many Commonwealth nations are being pushed towards China, a power all too eager to offer quick fixes and easy credit through the Belt and Road Initiative. This should set off alarm bells in Whitehall and across the Commonwealth.
If the US chooses to withdraw from the world stage, as is its right, the UK must step up. That means leading a reinvigoration of Commonwealth trade, not as an exercise in nostalgia, but as a firm and practical response to an emerging geopolitical vacuum.
The impact of Trump’s new tariffs will be felt most acutely by developing nations. For many in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, the message from Washington is clear that access to the US market can no longer be relied upon. In the absence of credible alternatives, China’s offers of infrastructure and investment, however difficult the true cost is to discern, will fill the void.
The consequences of Chinese lending are already being felt across the Commonwealth. From Zambia and Kenya to Pakistan and Sri Lanka, there is a consistent strategy. The Chinese Communist Party offers generous initial credit, costly repayments, and limited transparency. The idea of “debt trap diplomacy” may oversimplify Beijing’s intent, but the effect is the same: dependency on China, diminished fiscal and political sovereignty, and mounting strategic leverage for Beijing.
The UK has a strategic opportunity to fill part of that void. The Commonwealth accounts for just 9% of total UK trade, yet the potential for growth is enormous. Commonwealth members trade 20% more with one another than with non-members, thanks to shared language, legal systems and cultural ties. The so-called “Commonwealth Advantage” is real, but remains largely untapped.
Intra-Commonwealth trade hit $854 billion in 2022 and is projected to exceed $1 trillion by 2026. Yet the UK’s presence in that growth remains narrow, concentrated in just five nations, Australia, Canada, India, Singapore and South Africa, which together account for 70% of our Commonwealth trade. There is both scope and a strategic imperative to go much further.
The immediate priority must be meaningful progress on the UK-India trade agreement and upgrades to existing deals with Canada and the Pacific. The UK should also embrace the less glamorous but high-impact work of trade facilitation: supporting partners to modernise customs systems, harmonise regulations and reduce barriers for UK businesses, particularly SMEs.
Fundamentally, we must offer credible alternatives to Chinese capital. That means expanding UK-backed development finance, reforming and strengthening institutions like British International Investment, and encouraging transparent, commercially sustainable infrastructure investment across the Commonwealth. The aim is not to mimic China, but to counter it with better terms, higher standards and the shared values that the Commonwealth personifies.
A revitalised Commonwealth, led by the UK, can be a stabilising force, a network rooted in democracy, transparency and mutual respect. Trade has always been about more than commerce; it is about influence. Ultimately, we must ask whether we want Commonwealth nations trading with friends, or beholden to powers with very different values?